usage as a banking instrument. Although he was initially in favour of a 'monetarist' approach to European integration, he was one of the first to develop arguments for a symmetrical Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The careful balance that he sought reappeared in the Werner Report of 1970, which was offered as the official blueprint for EMU in the European Union (EU). Werner's claims to be an architect of EMU are threefold: his intellectual contribution to goal-setting, his effective political negotiation methods, and his consensus-building skills.
Based on the previously unpublished Werner family archives and on an extensive selection of original interviews, this chapter examines Pierre Werner's work in favour of EMU and reveals his role as an architect of this process. The first part focuses on Werner's intellectual background and European commitment. The second looks at his monetary thinking and political action in the 1960s. The third section considers the Werner Report and Werner's personal contribution as chair to its work in terms of both substance-a parallel approach, a balanced final outcome, and the external dimension of EMU-and the forging of a political consensus. The final part assesses his legacy.
WERNER' S INTELLECTUAL AND CAREER BACKGROUND
Werner was born of Luxembourgish parents in Saint-André near Lille, France, on 29 December 1913. In 1934 he enrolled in the higher preparatory course in law in Luxembourg. As his country did not have a university, he continued his studies at the Faculty of Law in Paris, where he also attended courses at the École libre des sciences politiques. In January 1938 he completed his PhD in Law and prepared to embark on a career as a lawyer. From early on, Werner was an active member of the Association of Catholic University Students, which he chaired from 1935 to 1937. In 1937 he became vice-president of the International Movement of Catholic Intellectuals (Pax Romana). During his time in Paris he lived at the Biermans-Lapôtre Foundation, whose alumni included many members of the Luxembourg elite. In this period Werner joined the European ranks of Catholic thinkers. Inspired by the theologian Robert Picard de la Vacquerie, he began to take an interest in the 'authentic Christian politics' advocated by Jacques Maritain, whose influential political theory was one of the main bases for the Christian Democratic movement. Werner also became deeply involved in the work carried out by Robert Garric's 'social teams' (Équipes sociales). From that time on, the principles of social Catholicism strongly characterized his political and social approach.
During his studies, Werner was particularly interested in public and private finance, forging useful links with his teachers Jacques Rueff and Wilfrid Baumgartner, both influential French finance officials, as well as with Charles Rist, deputy governor of the Banque de France. They influenced his intellectual development and stimulated his curiosity for the study of economic and monetary questions. In Paris, he met another Luxembourg native, Robert Schuman, a member of the French National Assembly, who tried to whet his appetite for politics and who was to become an iconic figure in the launch of post-war European integration.
As a young lawyer at the Luxembourg bar, in 1938 Werner was awarded an internship at the Banque Générale de Luxembourg (BGL), in which the Deutsche Bank (DB) had taken a major holding. He escaped Nazi persecution thanks to Hermann Abs, chairman of the board and appointed by the Deutsche Bank. Abs' benevolent attitudes helped protect those who, like Werner, refused to join Nazi organizations. Werner's family was not, however, spared by the war. Pierre's younger brother was forcibly conscripted for 'labour service' (Arbeitsdienst) and died at a labour camp in eastern Prussia on 15 January 1945. Werner's work in the secretariat of the BGL prompted him to write a report on the monetary, financial, and banking situation in Luxembourg in 1942. He managed to send the report to the Luxembourg government in exile in London through the Martin network of the French Resistance.
At the Liberation, Werner became an attaché in the finance ministry. In 1945, he was tasked with carrying out a study of the reorganization of the banking system in Luxembourg. Subsequently he was appointed banking commissioner. In this capacity he was involved in the creation of an authority to organize and regulate the credit market and contributed to the establishment of international financial relations. He was associated with the operations for the reintroduction of the franc, the refloating of banking activities, and the re-establishment of the main Luxembourg state bank, the Banque et Caisse d'Épargne de l'État. He represented Luxembourg in international negotiations, particularly in Switzerland and within the BLEU and the Benelux. As adviser to Prime Minister Pierre Dupong on financial affairs, Werner also took part in multilateral dealings relating to defence, including NATO, the abortive European Defence Community (EDC), and the Western European Union (WEU). At a very early stage he became familiar with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1947, with the support of Ambassador Hugues Le Gallais, he successfully negotiated a loan of $12.7 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) for the reconstruction of Luxembourg. Werner worked closely with the Luxembourg prime minister, who was increasingly of the view that this competent, meticulous expert was the best man to assume the functions of finance minister. This promotion duly came about in December 1953, when Werner was asked to join the new cabinet set up by Joseph Bech, following Dupong's untimely death.
After the 1959 elections, Werner became prime minister. For twenty yearsfrom 1959 to 1974 and from 1979 to 1984-he directed the coalition cabinets that the Christian Social Party (CSV) formed with either the liberal party or the socialist party. His role as president of the government was combined with other ministerial portfolios in what were seen as priority areas for a country that was constantly innovating and developing. He served as minister for finance (1959-64 and 1969-74) , for the Treasury (1964-9 and 1979-84), for foreign affairs and justice (1964-7), as well as for the civil service (1967-9) and for cultural affairs (1969-74 and 1979-84) .
As finance minister, Werner turned his attention to major projects with a view to making Luxembourg a forward-looking country and a true international platform. The development programme for the 'European quarter' on the Kirchberg (1961) was a major trump card in the country's hand during the 'battle for the seats' in 1965. He worked hard to diversify the economy, especially focusing on consolidating Luxembourg's transformation from a banking centre to an international financial centre from the 1960s onwards, nurturing the idea for a Luxembourg shipping flag, developing the audiovisual sector, and, in particular, setting up the satellite project.
For the 1974-9 parliamentary term, the CSV went into opposition and Werner was chair of his party's parliamentary group. He encouraged the CSV to pursue an approach inspired by the British tradition of 'Her Majesty's loyal opposition', which enabled it to play a constructive role in the consensusbased management of the steel crisis. One of the results was the establishment of the 'steel tripartite' (an institutionalized platform for dialogue between the government, employers, and employees), which subsequently became the Luxembourg model for social consultation.
The new Werner government took office in 1979 and worked to ensure a smooth post-industrial transition for Luxembourg. It successfully overcame the unrest in the BLEU and for the first time laid down Luxembourg's monetary status in a comprehensive, coherent way. Werner took measures to transform his party and brought Jean-Claude Juncker, aged just twentyeight, into the government as state secretary for labour affairs. In July 1984, when his party again won the general election, Werner passed the baton to his long-time fellow-worker Jacques Santer and withdrew from political life. He remained active in public affairs, particularly focusing his energies on the promotion of EMU and the euro, notably as joint chair, alongside Raymond Barre, of the Lyon-based ECU Institute, a think-tank composed of international economic and financial experts that was set up in 1992 to promote the European currency. He also retained an active interest in the development of the media and the audiovisual sector, especially through the project for the Société Européenne des Satellites (SES). Werner passed away on 24 June 2002 in Luxembourg City.
A COMMITTED EUROPEAN
Werner had been aware of the importance of European issues since his university days. However, his commitment to European unification took firm shape in 1949, when he became convinced of the urgent need for the countries of Western Europe to undertake the economic and political construction of a united Europe. His experience of working in the international arena, 'particularly his awareness of the weakness and the divided state of Europe, made it almost an intellectual obligation' (Werner 1992, I: 34-5).
As a Luxembourger, Werner was naturally attached to the European idea. It offered a response to Luxembourg's main aspirations, which were linked to its specific geopolitical status as a small, multicultural, multilingual nation, sandwiched between two larger powers, France and Germany, as well as to its economic situation, which included a lack of natural resources, no central bank, and no national currency. The European principle of equality among states also guaranteed Luxembourg a role in decision-making and in the leadership of European organizations. By giving up part of its sovereigntywhich it had already shown it was prepared to do in the monetary field as a member of the BLEU-Luxembourg has, paradoxically, actually strengthened its sovereignty. Thanks to its 'mastery of small-state diplomacy' within the context of European integration, Luxembourg took on the role of mediator between larger powers and simultaneously succeeded in defending its vital interests, from the steel industry to the seats of the European institutions and its financial centre (Dyson 2015).
Werner was associated from the very outset with the major issues relating to European integration. He made a significant contribution to shaping the outcome of the battle over the political seats of the European institutions and to the choice of Luxembourg firstly as the workplace of the institutions in 1965, then as one of their permanent capitals; he also played a major role in the 'Luxembourg Compromise' of 1966 which ended the French 'empty-chair' policy and, not least, in the Werner Report of 1970.
The 'Luxembourg Compromise', which had been based on a Benelux strategy of mediation, encouraged the idea that Werner might one day stand for the role of president of the European Commission. However, it remained no more than a rumour, as he never really considered giving up his national electoral mandate. In the mid-1960s, in his efforts to affirm Luxembourg's position of leadership on the international stage, Werner was involved, alongside Pierre Pescatore, general secretary of the foreign ministry, in organizing an independent diplomatic service, based on national intellectual elites and continuing the work begun by Joseph Bech at the dawn of the Second World War.
From As finance minister and later prime minister, Werner was well aware of the potential of the banking sector for the diversification of an economy that was entirely dominated by the steel industry. Luxembourg had several distinguishing features which gave it a competitive advantage. They resulted in part from action taken by the government and in part from various external factors, including the interest equalization tax introduced in the United States in 1963 and the German securities transfer tax (Kuponsteuer) introduced in 1965. In particular, the absence of a central bank meant that Luxembourg-based banking establishments were not obliged to set aside compulsory minimum reserves. Furthermore, the dual Belgium-Luxembourg exchange market, which was managed by the Institut belgo-luxembourgeois du change (the Belgium and Luxembourg Exchange Institute), created a separation between commercial and financial transactions and facilitated international activities. The supervisory authority, the Commissariat au contrôle des banques (Banking Control Commission or CCB), was a small structure, with a dynamic decision-making process and a Commissioner with extensive powers, making it particularly responsive to opportunities as they arose. Finally, the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in Luxembourg was followed by the relocation to the country of the Community's financial institutions, including the European Investment Bank (EIB), which established its headquarters there in 1968. Their presence gave the Luxembourg financial centre a European dimension, placing it in a strong position to become an 'incubator' for monetary integration. The monetary association with Belgium meant that Luxembourg had only a 'virtual monetary authority', exercised by the CCB. However, this did not stop the country from playing an active role in international monetary debates, with its representatives regularly invited to participate, alongside the experts of National Bank of Belgium, in the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision and the Group of Ten.
The proactive policy of the successive Werner governments in the decade from 1960 to 1970 led to the development and specialization of Luxembourg's international financial centre. It became a pillar of the economy and served as a 'laboratory' for a common European currency. In 1959 the first US bank opened in Luxembourg as Crédit Européen, followed by the first Luxembourg investment fund, Eurunion. In 1961, the Luxembourg stock exchange became a founding member of the International Federation of Stock Exchanges. In 1965, the legal status of 'financial holding company' was created to attract long-term capital by eliminating double taxation. In 1967, the first branches of German, Swiss, and Portuguese banks arrived in Luxembourg. Subsequently, in 1969 Werner set up an informal think-tank on the financial centre, including Triffin, Jean Blondeel, Fernand Collin, Constant Franssens, Edmond Israel, and Raymond Kirsch, to analyse future trends with a view to identifying the prospects for Luxembourg within EMU.
Werner had a way of thinking about economic and monetary affairs which was quite his own and was built up from personal ideas and the contributions of others. He was inspired by the unique situation of Luxembourg, a country which did not have its own central bank or national currency and had therefore always favoured currency unions.
In the lecture 'What Monetary Integration Means' ('Significations d'une intégration monétaire'), Werner (1960) set out his first thoughts on European monetary integration. Evoking the lessons learned from the Benelux Union, which was based on a monetary agreement, he stressed that economic cooperation and integration come about more directly through the instrument of monetary policy, 'but that unilateral and therefore brutal decisions were not desirable':
Between sovereign countries, monetary rapprochement can only be gradual and concomitant with the rapprochement of economic policies . . . and monetary unification comes at the end rather than the beginning of the integration process. (Werner 1960: 4) A common market required not just a financial order within the EEC but a financial order on a broader continental or world scale. At the same time, with respect to the financial order of the EEC, it was not enough for it to join a broader monetary system: 'a stronger Community slant should be given to their financial policies'. Werner proposed the progressive introduction of a European currency of account capable of lessening the risks caused by speculative movements of capital. In the EEC's international relations, this European currency 'would supply a benchmark for value shielded from ups and downs in the national currencies, facilitate the expansion of international trade and encourage the development of savings'. Private use could be introduced gradually to 'accustom people, little by little, to this collective currency' (Werner 1960: 10).
Werner was in tune with the ideas of Robert Triffin, who looked ahead to a gradual disintegration of the international monetary system and argued for the setting up of a European monetary union. On this topic, Werner was in contact with his Belgian opposite number, Pierre Wigny, and with Belgian banker Fernand Collin. The latter, with whom Werner had had discussions since 1956 on the subject of a European unit of account for private use, was actively involved in setting up some of the special features of Luxembourg as a financial centre. At the instigation of finance minister Werner, the Luxembourg financial centre was the first to issue international bonds denominated in European units of account (EUAs). In January 1961, Kredietbank SA Luxembourgeoise (KBL), of which Collin was president and Triffin a member of the board, issued the first loan of 5 million EUAs to the Portuguese oil company Sacor. A second followed in 1962. Paradoxically, these protoEurobonds were never recognized. In July 1963, the first Eurobonds were listed on the Luxembourg stock exchange, in US dollars, for the Italian motorway network Autostrade.
Although he was not yet a member of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, as early as the summer of 1961 Werner was in contact with Monnet and was familiar with the Committee's proposal for the establishment of a European union of the monetary reserves of the Six EEC Member States.
Werner kept up to date with developments in economic and monetary thinking, testing some of his ideas and initiatives in a wide range of settings. Pride of place went to regular meetings with European heads of state and government, especially when affiliation to Christian Democracy gave him an added kinship with them; to the discussions which took place within the BLEU and the Benelux; and to the meetings of the EEC finance ministers, in which he was involved for many years. In November 1962, Werner was the first EEC head of government to react favourably to the Action Programme for the Second Stage of the EEC, which European Commissioner Robert Marjolin had presented one month earlier (see Chapter 3 by Katja Seidel). In the lecture 'Issues Relating to Financial Integration in Europe' ('Problèmes de l'intégration financière de l'Europe'), Werner (1962) once again asserted the relevance of a European unit of account, which he saw as a means of giving a kick-start to a European monetary system. He emphasized the need for fixed exchange rates and a common monetary discipline and solidarity in a specific institutional framework, that is to say a 'monetary institute which could concomitantly develop its role as a clearing house between the central banks'. Werner went on to say that:
The method recommended here would enable monetary integration to proceed along the lines of development of the Community's tasks without impinging on national responsibilities and without premature dispossession . . . The unification of economic policies will never be absolute: at specific times, short-term economic measures may be imposed in this or that country. (Werner 1962: 9) It was only in 1964 that some of the European Commission's recommendations in terms of monetary policy started to take practical shape, in particular with the creation of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks (CGCB), which was set up in June 1963, and the establishment of collaboration between the Member States on international monetary relations in 1964. They reflected a growing concern to make further progress in European monetary integration.
In 1965, Werner was the first head of government, whilst president-in-office of the EEC Council, to emphasize the importance of monetary integration as part of the Community's internal and external policy. In an address given to the European Parliament, he stressed 'the need to set up . . . common monetary procedures and . . . the need to enshrine fixed exchange rates in a set of monetary rules' (Werner 1966b: 8) . At the annual meeting of governors of the IMF in 1966, he spoke as an 'advocate for European monetary policy' (Werner 1966a: 3).
In 1967-8, the turbulence in the international monetary system became increasingly apparent. The idea of setting up an area of monetary stability in Europe and thereby protecting the European economies from the upheavals which the dismantling of the Bretton Woods system would cause began to gain strength (Van Yperseele and Koeune 1988: 41). In these circumstances, Werner used the Europaforum congress on 26 January 1968, alongside Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein, the president of the European Commission, to outline his views of the 'Prospects for Europe's Financial and Monetary Policy' ('Perspectives de la Politique Financière et Monétaire Européenne') (Werner 1968a). He set out a theoretical structure for the means and instruments of practical action in an increasingly unpredictable international context. Six months before the entry into force of the Customs Union between the EEC Member States, Werner put forward a roadmap to European monetary integration.
His action plan was based on five pillars: the creation of a European unit of account, prior consultation between national authorities, fixed exchange rates between the Member States, internal and external solidarity (particularly within the IMF), and the creation of a Community reserve fund. He emphasized the consequences of liberalizing capital flows and of the development of the Euromarkets, subjects that he had been able to analyse within the Luxembourg financial centre. His address foreshadowed the main theme of the first Barre memorandum, which the EC Commission published the following month (see Chapter 4 by David Howarth). However, the memorandum did not refer to the monetary union and the reserve fund that had been recommended by Triffin, the Monnet Action Committee, and Werner. The six EEC heads of state and government agreed that a plan by stages should be drawn up by the Council in 1970 for the establishment of an economic and monetary union. An ad hoc committee would be set up for this purpose. They also decided 'to arrange for the investigation of the possibility of setting up a European reserve fund in which a joint economic and monetary policy would have to result' (EC 1969: 13). The proposal on the ERF, which Monnet asked
Triffin to draw up, was sent to Brandt, an active member of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, who presented it at the Hague Summit. The final agreement reflected the differences of approaches between the various representatives and foreshadowed the later clashes between the French and the Germans. While Brandt considered the effective harmonization of economic policies to be a prerequisite for the establishment of the ERF, Pompidou insisted on the introduction of a system for balance of payments assistance and a monetary union between the Six which would consolidate their position on the international stage.
On 6 March 1970, the EC Council decided on the composition of the ad hoc group. There were three main reasons for the choice of members. First, responsibility for examining the issues raised by the Hague Summit had to be in the hands of officials in charge of economic and financial policy in the Member States. Second, the figures concerned had to have a special commitment and considerable experience in European integration. Lastly, any solution put forward had to have the widest possible support at government level. The group was formed of the leaders of the various specialized committees of the EEC, who also held high national offices. The experts were supposed to exercise their role on the committee in an individual capacity and in full independence. However, their behaviour increasingly reflected the positions of their governments. The composition of the group was such that Luxembourg was the only one of the Six not to be represented. The initial idea was for the committee to be jointly chaired by Luxembourg and the European Commission, and a Franco-German proposal put forward the name of Clappier as representative of the Commission. Clappier suggested that he should withdraw in favour of Ansiaux. It was at this point that Werner's name was put forward by Barre, who proposed that Luxembourg should chair the committee on its own. Baron Snoy on behalf of Belgium launched the official proposal, drafted and published the diplomatic document, and worked to secure the agreement of the three partners. But it was thanks to Karl Schiller, who managed to bypass the double-dealing by France and bring the Netherlands on board, that the initiative came to fruition (Danescu 2012b).
Werner's appointment as chair of the group was not just a highly political choice but a considered act in favour of a man with a strong reputation for forging a consensus. At the same time his 'monetarist' approach and his close involvement in the group's work gave rise to reservations. Ultimately, even those who had previously harboured reservations now came out in support of Werner. At the Council meeting, the Dutch prime minister, Joseph Luns, stated: 'I regard [this] proposal that the prime minister of Luxembourg be invited to assume the chairmanship of the ad hoc group as very timely, since, aside from his many other qualities, Mr Werner has had a great deal of quite specific experience in this field; what is more, the importance of the office which he holds will make a definite contribution to the work of the group.' 3 The ad hoc group held a preliminary meeting in Luxembourg on 11 March 1970 and started its work on 20 March, again in Luxembourg. The main purpose of these first meetings was to approve the working method. It was agreed that there would be a quorum if at least five of the seven members were present. Decisions would be taken by simple majority. The group would do its best to present unanimous conclusions. Discussions were considered to be confidential and would only be minuted briefly. The experts decided to deliver a preliminary report by the end of May and to conclude their work by the end of July 1970. These early debates brought out the fundamental thinking of the committee. Priority issues were the pooling of the Six's reserves and the establishment of a Community central bank. The experts adopted a threepoint analysis: a description of the starting point, the final goal, and the alternative routes that could be followed in carrying out the plan. They decided to focus on defining the first stage of EMU.
The task of drafting the report was delegated to the assistants, who met on 6 and 8 May under the chairmanship of the Belgian central banker Mertens de Wilmars. On 11 May their draft was ready and on 20 May the committee finally managed to reach agreement on a joint position. Werner presented the interim report to the ECOFIN meeting on 29 May in Venice, stressing that further work needed to be done on certain priority areas and emphasizing the need to achieve parallel progress in the monetary and economic fields. On 9 June in Luxembourg, the Council of Ministers approved the interim report and agreed that the committee should continue its work.
The deepening of the Werner Committee's work was carried out between June and October 1970. The preliminary draft of the final report was reworked in a select group including Tietmeyer, Looijen, Bloch-Lainé, and Mosca. The Werner Committee concluded that the establishment of EMU must be embarked on in an evolving, gradual manner, building on the measures already adopted to enhance the coordination of economic policies and monetary cooperation. While aware of the need for economic and monetary policies to be developed centrally, the committee stated straight away that it was not in a position to make proposals regarding political structures. The subsequent criticism of the final Werner Report for its failure to offer a detailed analysis of the architecture of the Community institutions has to be seen against the background of the initial decision of the group to remove this matter from the scope of its reflections.
On 7 October, the 'plan by stages for the establishment of EMU' was approved following a last-minute compromise. The next day, Werner presented it publicly in Luxembourg. Of the fourteen official meetings of the committee held from March to October 1970, nine took place in Luxembourg (consolidating its reputation as a permanent capital of the Communities), three in Brussels, one in Paris, one in Rome, and one in Copenhagen on the sidelines of the annual meeting of the IMF and the World Bank On 29 October, the EC Commission published its own proposals which were inspired by the report. Although they had similar aims, the proposals reflected different views. The German government voiced its dissatisfaction with the Commission's proposals, which were considered to be too limited and not to go far enough. More ominously still, the Werner Report elicited harsh criticism from orthodox Gaullists because of its supranational elements. Under pressure, the French government changed its policy, which led to the proposals being 'watered down'.
In line with the European Commission's proposals, the Six adopted a political resolution-albeit one with no legal force-on 22 March 1971, committing them to establishing EMU. However, developments in the international monetary system and the decision by US President Richard Nixon on 15 August 1971 to suspend the convertibility of the US dollar into gold were to thwart the shared ambition set out in the Werner Report, which had already been weakened by the absence of any real political will.
SEEKING A BALANCED APPROACH BETWEEN THE ECONOMISTS AND THE MONETARISTS
The placing of EMU on the EEC agenda catalysed different national visions of European monetary integration (Gros and Thygesen 1998). In January and February 1970 several governments provided the Werner Committee with their views on EMU: Belgium (the Snoy Plan), Germany (the Schiller Plan), and Luxembourg, whose position, which was penned by Werner, was based on his five-point plan from 1968 (Werner 1970a). In March, the European Commission published the second Barre memorandum, which emphasized the critical link between economic coordination and monetary solidarity. When the European Commission compared the four documents, it defined two landmark positions: first, the Luxembourg Plan, which took the most purely monetarist approach, and second, the Schiller Plan, which put most stress on the role of the measures to be undertaken in the various spheres of economic policy.
Although all the partners agreed that the ultimate aim was to achieve EMU in ten years, the ways of achieving this goal were a source of debate. From the very start, the work of the Werner Committee was marked by the conflicting approaches between 'economists' and 'monetarists'. From the outset, the Germans (Schöllhorn, assisted by Tietmeyer) and the Dutch (Brouwer) supported the position of the Schiller Plan, namely that prior convergence of economic policies was imperative. The Belgians (Ansiaux) and the French (Clappier) advocated the monetarist stance. The Italian position on EMU was influenced by both economist and monetarist views and evolved over time (Maes and Quaglia 2004) . Luxembourg sided with the monetarists in its view that the economy was driven by deliberate monetary decisions. The priority was therefore for quick decisions on the margins for fluctuation between European currencies, concerted monetary action, and the establishment of a European reserve fund.
Werner attempted to arrive at a common Benelux position. However, the three finance ministers and governors of the central banks could not reach agreement: the Dutch sided clearly with the German economists. The Belgians came out in support of a currency equalization fund, to offset the floating exchange rates which were increasingly in use. At the group's second meeting on 7 April, Ansiaux raised the question of a fund in reaction to Schöllhorn, who firmly believed in the primacy of economic union. Werner appreciated the Germans' views in principle but saw them as 'too severe and not measured enough'. Although he agreed with Ansiaux, he was aware that the Member States were not ready to abandon the floating exchange rate system in favour of fixed but adjustable exchange rates.
The interim report seemed to tip the scales in favour of the 'economists', as was noted by Walter Hallstein who claimed that 'in substance, the report presents a compromise that tends towards the economists' position'. In response, Werner decided to work for a balanced solution (Werner 1989). He started by asking the EEC governments to commit to 'guaranteed parallel development' between economic cooperation and monetary coordination. Although at its meeting on 8 and 9 June in Luxembourg, ECOFIN approved this fundamental principle, the dispute between the two sides remained.
Werner also made sure that the views of the 'monetarists' were taken into account. On 12 June, he asked for an opinion from the CGCB on the exchange-rate regime in the Community. The committee was of the view that a European monetary cooperation fund should be established from the first stage of EMU. Werner shared this view. He firmly believed that a plan which made no provision for any innovation on the monetary front in the first three years, and involved nothing but pushing forward procedures for harmonizing economic and budgetary policies, without any monetary incentives to support it, would very probably become bogged down in interminable discussions at the Community level.
In the end, after heated debates into which everyone pitched, Werner sought to avoid a failure by securing a subtle compromise which was accepted unanimously. Speaking to the EEC foreign ministers on 26 October 1970 in Luxembourg, Werner stressed:
I am happy to note that on all these aspects we forged a unanimous collective view. Of course these joint replies do not reflect all the individual preferences of the members of the group. But we do think that having looked at the question from all sides, at long sessions where we compared a range of ideas, we have succeeded in giving shape to the wish for proceeding in parallel on the measures to be taken in the economic and financial fields. What we aspired to do was, once and for all, to break the vicious circle consisting of setting prior economic and political conditions. We have tried to draw a line midway between the view that monetary union is the crowning glory of European integration and the view that would turn it into the virtually all-powerful engine driving integration. I think the proposals are in line with the existing treaties, and that they do, precisely, ensure that the objectives of the treaties will be achieved in full. Thus for stage one we can go a great deal of the way without amending the treaties. However, there must be a strong political will backing up this process all the time that it is being put into effect. (Werner 1970b: 5) THE WERNER REPORT: AN ADEQUATE BLUEPRINT FOR EMU?
The Werner Report of 8 October 1970 offered a full definition of EMU, which was to be established in three stages over a period of ten years (1971-80). The ultimate aim was to achieve irreversible convertibility between the currencies of the Member States, the complete liberalization of capital movements, the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, and even potentially the replacement of national currencies by a single currency as a natural and desirable further development of monetary union. Monetary policy vis-à-vis the outside world would be a matter for the Community. Only the first three-year stage, due to begin on 1 January 1971 and loosely based on the first Barre memorandum, was clearly defined. It should be noted that the characteristic feature of this memorandum is a particular association of traditional German and French concepts: 'a French-inspired medium-term analysis was applied to the German idea of economic convergence' (Maes 1998b: 42).
The report emphasized the pursuit of common policies by the Member States, the introduction of greater coordination of national budget policies (centralization of the size and balance of national budgets and how they should be funded), as well as the harmonization of fiscal policies (VAT and excise duty rates) including taxation of capital, on which matter it called on the CGCB to define the appropriate guidelines. The report stressed the need to consult economic and social sectors before defining the guidelines of Community economic policy.
From an institutional viewpoint, the report called for the creation of two new steering bodies: a 'centre of decision for economic policy', independent of governments and placed under the democratic control of the European Parliament, to be elected by universal suffrage; and a 'Community system for the central banks'. This system would be preceded by the establishment of a European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF), based on Triffin's proposals but more limited in scope. EMU would serve as a 'leaven' for the development of a political union without which, ultimately, it would not be able to manage. This argument was prescient with respect to later criticisms of the architecture of the Maastricht Treaty, especially in the wake of the post-2008 Euro Area crisis.
The Werner Committee believed that these elements were indispensable for a complete EMU. The union-as described in the report-represented the minimum that had to be done and was a stage in a dynamic evolution that would be shaped by the pressure of events and political will.
Two main principles underpinned the drafting of the Werner Report: gradual realization of EMU by means of a step-by-step approach; and 'parallel movement in practice' (Tietmeyer 1971 (Tietmeyer , 2015 ; see also Chapter 7 by Kenneth Dyson). This principle of parallelism applied in three areas: parallel movement in progress towards economic policy convergence and the imposition of additional monetary constraints; parallel movement in the imposition of monetary constraints and the transfer of powers over economic policy to the Community; and parallel movement in the development of Community powers and the corresponding development of effective European institutions.
The Werner Report could have been the basis for a common response by the then Member States of the EEC to the dramatic change that occurred in the economic and monetary environment of the Western world in the first half of the 1970s. But the implementation of the plan was de facto suspended, as noted by the Marjolin Report of 8 March 1975 (see Chapter 3 by Katja Seidel). The report did have some 'intrinsic weaknesses', including 'insufficient constraints on national policies, institutional ambiguities [from a monetary, economic and fiscal viewpoint], inappropriate policy conception, [and] lack of internal momentum', which might explain its lack of success in the immediate term (Baer and Padoa-Schioppa 1989: 57). It was based on a regime of fixed (but adjustable) parities, despite the obvious weakness of the Bretton Woods system. Moreover, in its definition of the second and third stages of EMU, the report provided only general indications and did not lay down a timeframe. It was imprecise as to the definition of economic union and also relatively sketchy when it came to institutional matters.
But could the Werner Group have acted any differently to reach unanimous conclusions? The compromise was finely balanced. It provided for a 'system of central banks' that would be responsible for monetary policy. However, it was not specified that this system would be 'independent', as the Germans wanted. At the same time, the 'European monetary identity' did include supranational aspects, contrary to what the French preferred. The plan also adopted a centralist approach, aiming to resolve the majority of doctrinal and constitutional problems associated with EMU despite the seeming lack of compatibility between national sovereignty and the Community interest. The Werner Report was at the vanguard, making it 'operationally, institutionally and politically incompatible with the constitutional realities of states and of the treaty' (Ghymers 2015: 198) .
Nevertheless, the Werner Report became a blueprint for EMU in the European Community, as the Delors Report and the Maastricht Treaty would confirm twenty years later. The Delors Committee started its deliberations in September 1988 symbolically in Luxembourg with a thorough analysis of the Werner Report. It thus became the yardstick by which the feasibility and eventual success of the Delors Report would be measured (see Chapter 7 by Kenneth Dyson). Werner and Delors both emphasized the principles of progressive realization of EMU by stages and parallelism between economic convergence and transfer of powers to the supranational level. Moreover, their reports define monetary union in almost identical terms (Werner 1990; Delors 1992), but in some respects the Werner Report goes further and is more clear cut than the Delors Report. In its conclusions, the Werner Report firmly states that:
B: Economic and monetary union means that the principal decisions of economic policy will be taken at Community level and therefore that the necessary powers will be transferred from the national plane to the Community plane . . . 
PIERRE WERNER AND THE WERNER REPORT
Werner's private archives reveal that he made a major personal contribution to the method and substance of the Werner Report. In the first place, he contributed the three-point method. On 11 March 1970, at the group's preliminary meeting, Werner proposed a three-point working method based on a starting point, a final goal, and alternative routes between them-a very basic feature of the plan by stages. He drew his inspiration from the method used for the establishment of the Common Market, as evident in his five-point plan of 1968, which had been received with such enthusiasm. The Werner Committee sided with this approach, and the Werner Report was developed on this basis.
Werner also played a vital role in deepening the Werner Group's work for the final report. At a meeting of EEC finance ministers on 29 May in Venice, he emphasized the need for further work in six priority areas. They included institutional aspects of EMU, instruments for the coordination of short-term policy and economic policy in the medium term, and budgetary coordination instruments. 4 He based his suggestions on the view that economic union and monetary union had to proceed gradually and in perfect tandem. Political union was a longer-term objective, underlying the other two.
On the subject of exchange-rate rules, Werner specifically stipulated that there should be 'consultation with the governors of the central banks'. Although the finance ministers were in agreement on many conclusions, there were still differences of opinion, notably regarding the creation of an EEC exchange equalization fund prior to a common reserve fund. Nevertheless, it seemed essential to improve the coordination of the policies of intervention by the central banks in the foreign-exchange market.
All these proposals of Werner were to appear in the Council decision on furthering the work of the group and eventually in the final report. Werner also proposed 'consulting social partners on any important monetary decision', recommending that they should be associated with the development of Community economic policy.
In addition, Werner particularly favoured giving the CGCB a leading role in EEC monetary integration and advocated the essential role of the EMCF in promoting gradual convergence between different domestic monetary policies. In this respect, he may have been reassured by Ansiaux, the chair of the CGCB, whom he knew well from their many years working together within the Belgian-Luxembourg monetary union, and also by Clappier. 5 Werner had raised the idea of a European reserve fund as early as 1962, and in a more sustained manner from May 1967. In his five-point plan from 1968, he described the role and powers of such a fund, which would encourage financial solidarity and serve as an instrument to strengthen the coordination of economic policies in the Community. His approach was decidedly 'Triffinian'.
However, the CGCB remained very cautious about the EMCF, which it saw as a Trojan horse for political control over monetary policy that would put central bank independence at risk. Its own technical study, the so-called Ansiaux Report, therefore did not recommend its establishment. It concluded that, once a Community system for the narrowing of the fluctuation margins between the Community currencies had been set up and was functioning satisfactorily, the establishment of such a fund could be envisaged, subject to prior progress towards convergence of economic policies and coordination of monetary policies (James 2012). The EMCF was set up on 1 April 1973 but was reduced to a mere accounting tool for cooperation between the central banks.
Werner also worked to further the external dimension of EMU which the plan by stages entailed. From 1969 he was in regular contact with the US Federal Reserve and political authorities and with American financial circles, particularly through the Luxembourg financial centre. One idea that kept coming up was the consolidation of the future monetary identity and solidarity of Europe by ensuring that the Six spoke with one voice in international financial organizations, particularly in the IMF. Werner had several informal meetings with Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, managing director of the IMF, following the discussions that Monnet had had with him, as well as with Arthur Burns, chair of the US Federal Reserve Board. Washington had reservations about the idea of a European monetary bloc, which would stand in the way of increased flexibility in the international monetary system and seemed to be prompted by anti-American motives.
Last but not least, Werner was directly involved in the writing of the English version of the report and its dissemination in the English-speaking world, particularly in Britain. He held regular discussions with Edward Heath, the British prime minister.
MEDIATION AND NETWORK DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPING
A TWO-PILLAR APPROACH TO EMU One of Werner's key contributions was in mediating to bring the differing points of view in the committee closer together and secure an agreement on the interim report on 20 May 1970 and the final report on 7 October 1970. Thorny issues included the transfer of responsibility from the national to the Community level without engendering lasting tension; short-and mediumterm economic policy; the necessity for the main decisions on monetary and credit policy to be taken in common; and the need for real decision-making power to be given to the Community bodies. The controversy between the 'economists' and the 'monetarists' was so marked that it was impossible to reach any unanimous conclusions on these issues-a fundamental principle for the group's work. The Action Committee for the United States of Europe was a strong pillar of Werner's network, and he kept in permanent contact with Triffin and Monnet. 6 He consulted them a great deal on the sources of influence into which he must tap, especially in Germany and the Netherlands, the two Member States most reluctant to agree to a common position on the final report. Werner and Monnet were close to Brandt, using this relationship to good effect; 7 whilst the approaches of Gaston Eyskens, the Belgian prime minister, and of Baron Snoy to Johan Witteveen, the Dutch finance minister and deputy prime minister, also helped to achieve the desired result.
Werner drew upon a wide range of political contacts to gain influence. He negotiated a common position within the ECOFIN Council directly with finance ministers Giscard d'Estaing and Schiller. 8 He also called Clappier and other members of the EEC Monetary Committee to mediate among the Member States. Furthermore, Ansiaux asked Triffin to exercise his good offices by persuading German and Dutch officials to agree to the parallelism principle. 9 Werner consulted central bankers, notably Ansiaux, Carli, Otmar Emminger of the Bundesbank, and Zylstra, as well as Rinaldo Ossola from the Banca d'Italia, chair of the Group of Ten.
The result of an astute compromise, the Werner Report can be considered as another 'Luxembourg Compromise', secured by Werner. From 1968 onwards, Werner was one of the first to develop arguments in favour of the 'parallelism principle':
We can identify two schools of thought: one is of the view that the monetary community will fall like a ripe fruit from the common policy tree . . . and one maintains that the development of a real economic and stabilization policy will be hindered by the absence of monetary unification. I believe that the truth lies at the midpoint between these two extremes. (Werner 1968c: 5-6) In discharging his duties as chair of the group of experts, Werner chose to remain neutral, advocating a parallel approach to economic cooperation and monetary coordination as the underlying principle for the group's reflections. He adopted a median position in the dispute between the various trends in monetary and economic thinking, between which it fell to him to arbitrate in order to bring the work of the Werner Committee to a successful conclusion.
WERNER' S CONTRIBUTION AND LEGACY
As prime minister and finance minister of Luxembourg over several decades, Werner emerged to play a rare statesman-like role in the process of European unification in the second half of the twentieth century. He was all too aware of the particular geopolitical and historical situation of his country. For Luxembourg, adopting an outward orientation had always been a sine qua non. Werner was convinced of the need to preserve national sovereignty and vital interests by maintaining an international outlook. Accordingly, he placed the process of European integration at the centre of Luxembourg policy. Werner's foresight and his pragmatic approach enabled him to develop long-term strategies and focus on what was achievable. His political method was based on three main principles: anticipation, innovation, and consensus (Danescu 2015) .
Werner can be considered as an architect of EMU for three main reasons. First, he possessed considerable expertise as a policy-maker and was able to translate this expertise into influence on agenda-setting and decision-making in the development of EMU. Monetary policy was a major and sensitive bastion of national sovereignty, and the Member States were unwilling to make concessions. Werner was unanimously recognized as an 'honest broker' who helped to generate momentum and forward movement. He forged this consensus-builder reputation on three levels: the domestic level by promoting dialogue with both sides of industry, the 'social partners', which led to the Luxembourg model of social consultation; the regional level within the BLEU and the Benelux as a leading proponent of small-state diplomacy; and the EEC level, above all in EMU. His name is closely linked with two key milestones in European integration: the 1966 'Luxembourg Compromise' which put an end to the 'empty-chair' crisis and reconciled France with Europe; and the 1970 Werner Report which laid the foundations for the single European currency. Alongside his key mediator role, Werner provided a vital contribution to the substance of the plan in relation to both the parallelism principle and the concept of stages.
Second, Werner contributed his own vision of EMU. From the early 1950s onwards, Werner called for the establishment of a European monetary system based on a unit of account, for both official and private usage, and on a clearing house for central banks. He made monetary policy a pivotal part of his government's action. In addition, the burgeoning Luxembourg international financial centre, which experienced major growth in the early 1960s, served as a vanguard for a European currency unit. As early as 1962, Werner raised the idea of an EEC monetary cooperation fund, as the prelude to a common monetary policy. In 1968, his 'balanced monetarist' approach was evident when he delivered a clear roadmap to get to EMU and advocated the idea of gradualism and 'effective parallelism' in European integration. For Werner, economic union and monetary union had to work in perfect tandem, with political union as the ultimate aim. In his view, social Europe and the coordination of budgetary and monetary policies were intrinsic characteristics of EMU.
Third, Werner developed a tradition of Luxembourg 'network diplomacy' and European integration leadership (Dyson 2015). He forged his ideas by cultivating long-term productive exchanges of views with other instigators of monetary innovation like Collin, Rueff, and Triffin, as well as with financial technocrats like Ansiaux, Carli, Emminger, and Zijlstra. There was also a notably strong Belgian dimension to these exchanges. In addition, Werner remained in close contact with the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, above all with Monnet, Brandt, Hallstein, and Marjolin. Although he never claimed to be an academic expert, Werner exerted his influence at various levels of Community decision-making and became a key figure in intellectual debates between monetary elites and in the efforts to establish consensual transnational guidelines on monetary matters.
Werner also served as mentor and leadership trend-setter for other leading political figures in Luxembourg who later became active on EMU matters. This process can be traced back to the time of Joseph Bech (prime minister from 1953 to 1958 and one of the key figures of the Messina Conference) and, besides Werner, included Gaston Thorn (prime minister from 1974 to 1979 and president of the European Commission from 1981 to 1985), Jacques Santer (prime minister from 1984 to 1995 and president of the European Commission from 1995 to 1999), and Jean-Claude Juncker, long-serving president of the Eurogroup (2004-13) and European Commission president from 2014. Luxembourg political leaders proved masters of the art of political consensus and the country was a rich source of 'men of providence' who were able to help find a way out of Europe's successive impasses. The influential nature of this leadership has given Luxembourg a role in the European integration process that far outweighs the country's socio-economic size. 
